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the unstoppable desire of man to create, on this occasion, complex financial instruments, is home to some extent the current crisis. To keep stumbling over the same stone, the market has recently delivered a new form of equity for banks to improve their ratios and raise funds. These are called CoCos, how nice to call the "contingent convertible ."
The CoCos are essentially debt, but, like the "Gremlins" became much worse when they are wet, CoCos become the capital to certain contingencies, especially if the numbers of solvency of the issuer falls below a certain level.
In Spain, the figure has not come as such but a kind of parental adaptation is all the rage with the capital requirements of the Bank of Spain: mandatorily convertible obligations, a kind of the English CoCos whose establishment has been forced, as so often, the Santander . Booty bank, moved to its sales force to place their customers 7,000 million mandatorily convertible bonds in 2007 for the purpose of addressing the huge capital needs that generated the flood of purchases was facing outside. The key is that mandatory convertible bonds are securities pay interest while they are bonds that come a moment ... oh, surprise ... they become actions in certain conditions ... with all that that entails .
The fact is that competitors Santander ridiculed the instrument at the time but now almost all have chosen the same path as BBVA, Popular, Sabadell Bankinter has launched a fever of mandatory convertible bonds into shares, each with its peculiarities and several wrongs. For banks, the CoCos fear they are ... because account as principal and can overcome the bar of 8% set by the Bank of Spain to the financial institutions listed. Given the scatter of this type of security, law recapitalization of the financial sector means that those already reported simply that the terms of engagement have been made to convert into ordinary shares before December 31, 2014 but for the new issue conditions are much more stringent and must be converted into shares on or before December 31, 2014 or "before that date in case of reorganization or restructuring of the entity or group. " That is the co ntingencia which co CoCos nvertibles to early English and can assume that, ultimately derived from its coupon bond condition is replaced by a dividend to be charged you know if as and when ... Therefore, the possibility of runs to be part of the shareholders of a bank inadvertently or because they give the contingency provided or because they reach the time limit laid down, investors should be aware that what they are buying are more bonds and shares rather than risk assessment based on this .
is not afraid to risk, but to recognize, assess and be able to sleep with him soundly.
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In 2000, Florentino Perez, one of the greatest entrepreneurs and president of the English construction company ACS, he was elected president of Real Madrid football club. Despite recent successes in sporting competitions both nationally and in the Champions League, merengue voters gave a clear protest vote against the economic policy conducted by the former white rulers, politics that in addition to leave the club coffers increasingly deteriorating, threatening to force their conversion to the legal form of sporting society. Florentino Pérez , thanks to a highly aggressive marketing policy, the signings of the brightest stars the football world and certainly the confluence of some fortunate circumstances as renegotiating the rise in television contracts and the disposal of the Sports City, managed to change the general perception about the economic situation of the entity, but " This sudden improvement was more illusion than reality? and were equally aggressive "accounting procedures to reflect the time of his assets? To test this, we will try to get closer to reality book club, through its financial statements since 1999, immediately prior to the start of the new president, until 2002, for many, final vesting date of the new economic model.
and finance Football
Analyze account income in particular is not too many secrets, or give income to cover expenses or income phagocytose; from hence, adding or subtracting you get the result, whether we speak of a sports club or a hairdresser. In 1999, Real Madrid was unable to get this result showed positive. In addition, the entity "enjoyed" about exceptionally low capital, a large debt and deferred income almost entirely willing , difficulties in accessing bank credit is beginning to show clear and so the suppliers have replaced banks as the main source of funding. However, just three seasons later, the club forced the world in the pursuit of sports titles proclaimed proudly, that the debt had almost disappeared, which had boosted income - ordinary and extraordinary - and that almost miraculously, the net cash position would sign a one or even two of the best players in the world each year. Not bad for those who solo unos años antes no podía pagar a tiempo las fichas de sus jugadores…
El problema de los ingresos… ¿resuelto al fin?
Los ingresos ordinarios del fútbol son limitados y no evolucionan precisamente al alza. Dichos ingresos son, a saber, el taquillaje, los derechos de televisión y la publicidad, y el Madrid ingresó por dichos conceptos en 2002 unos 152 millones de Euros . Dos años antes ascendieron a 164 millones . Los gestores del club, avisados de esta circunstancia, eran plenamente conscientes de que los incrementos esperados no daban para sanear la situación economic and turned her head to other sources of revenue hitherto considered extraordinary: merchandising revenue . In 2000, this item was simply 0 Euros, but in 2001 already amounted to some 12 million Euros and a year later, reached 16 million direct result of the acquisition policy emblematic players . This hiring effort led to an exponential rise in staff costs and tremendous cuts in other items but also must set up a new interest in stroke many new lines of business based, in my opinion, investing in "staff costs", in expensive and wages that enable chips to maximize the active sports in which they invest and, ultimately, make extraordinary income in the most ordinary of income.
Vitamins "accounting?
We can not here present a full account of the results but, in short, the seasons 1999 - 2002 are at least economically hazardous. In 1999, operating income reached 116 million while costs were above the 130 million . It is rather difficult to find companies whose current business is paid in this way regularly and manage to stay alive. Staff costs and depreciation of the "intangible assets" - euphemism you want to mention the white players - almost completely ate revenue and expenditure items related to overall finish with them. The result thus further deteriorating because of the expense and balanced only making use of the extraordinary desperate that ultimately were able to produce a result after tax 2.94 million, a mere 2.53% operating income (... and an associated ROI of less than 1%).
In 2000, the trend described above not only corrected but not worse because of rising overhead and sheets of some of the allegedly best players in the world. When you see how they managed to redirect the Ebitda , surprised by the presence of an operating income amounting to 34.7 million Euros received by the white club for the sale of a preferential claim on the assignment of future rights television for a period of 5 years and fully accounted for as income . The meteoric rise in operating income was overshadowed, however, because more than 13 million euros in financial expense. This made the current result of this season was a paltry 657,000 Euros .
In 2001, already in full command Florentino Perez, revenue fell further, and operating expenses led to impressive heights - up to 224 million Euros - As a result, for 100 euros Florentino joined Madrid in first year, spent $ 162, the majority - nearly 86% - to pay the tabs on the first team. Recurrent expenditure also went up because of the brutal increase in amortization of intangible assets. Examining all these items, it seems free hesitation about the goodness of the administration by the President of ACS. It seems that the situation not only has not improved but has clearly been worse, that the expenditure side goes completely oversized and that the results are saved based on extra income and undisputedly highly unusual strange ...
Florentino management yields data just as interesting in the chapter on sports personnel. Specifically, the number of managers grew so big that if one compares the total of these workers, it seems much for so little army general. In season 2001, the ratio must have been so indefensible, that the auditor agreed to when making the calculation of the average workforce, including all types of directors, officers and board members , presumably to lower the rate of average pay per employee.
Fortunately, a set of accounting rules - Malabar worked miracles in the results provided by Florentino at the end of the 2001 season. On that date, sold to Real Madrid and Caja Madrid Sogecable certain percentages of the rights of the majority of the proceeds from merchandising, image player, Internet presence ... worth more than 117 million euros ! These revenues covered a period of 11 years but were counted in full this season and finished motivating a profit before tax of about 31.5 million Euros Where did the early correlation of income and expenses? And the accrual? ... In any case, the accounting irregularity appears manifest, first because the transfer of rights could be an operation loan as a sale pure and simple, and second, because even accepting the entry, it should have been recognized on a multiannual basis.
Selling City Sports
Without doubt, the 2002 season was a milestone in sports because the achievement of the ninth Champions League. In this exercise was carried out when selling City Sports , transforming it into an urban development over 150,000 meters square soil tertiary use. The sale earned him a special benefit to Madrid more than 379 million Euros although provisioned, as extraordinary, the net book value of the facilities that the club ceased to be used, for an amount of about 15 million Euros . This sale allowed to close the year 2002 with net income of 9.3 million Euros . This data, at first glance innocuous, indicates that at Madrid he returned to save the extraordinary.
Not all patrimonial consequences of this alienation are negative or questionable with the results of the sports club canceled all bank loans had, ending their historic debt, mostly a result of the refurbishment work on the Santiago Bernabeu stadium, construction dating from the times of the late Ramon Mendoza. And thanks to the eligibility for the special exemption for the sale of assets are managed differ for many years the tax effects resulting from the operation. In summary, the Madrid happened in four years, living strangled by a huge amount of short-term liabilities to enjoy a more than bearable debt with the public finances ... thanks to a brilliant operation and completely legal.
Amortizing, which is gerund
Still in the year 2002, the ordinary income reach 152 million Euros but operating costs reach 471 million . In addition, Madrid decided to offset the benefit possible effect of the gain on the sale of the Sports City and profit to repay to the single euro of the existing investment in rights to acquire players, specifically, for a total amount Euros 283 million ... The problem? Well, the club board decided to radically change the accounting policy in force until that time and went to pay off the players at the end of the year in which it was acquired, in contravention of a ministerial order requiring companies to write off sports assets depending on the duration of the contract for each of them. Such amortization allowed to completely offset the gains generated during the year and prepare an economic outlook for the coming years where you just have to write off the investment that is generated. The perversion of the system can reach its zenith in transposition exercise club Ronaldo Da Lima , ultimately, the only player from the first template, accounting, had some value. The following year, the accounting cost of production machinery, namely the players, who in the end are those who give economic content and sporty at the club, will be zero.
treatment investment
If we move along the path of sports intangible assets, in essence, the legs of the players proves unstoppable growth, and in 1999 was based on Gross investment 91 million euros but became 334 million in late 2002. In the case of equipment merengue, such investments were not reflected in an increase in the balance sheet items but rather to the contrary, because of the depreciation policy explained above. In 2002 year the asset is not already almost any item for gamers. The only important input, the "other tangible" results from an accounting move made long ago: In its day, the club sold the merchandising rights, bars and sports facilities, posting good gains recorded in your account results. However, four days before the end of 1998 the repurchased by about 80 million euros What is the genius of the play? Well, for anyone to recognize goodwill, there must be a transfer by onerous . Through the acquisition, the club got the price of the transaction were to become a part of tangible assets in the balance perfectly and fully amortizing. To top it off, while later he got back to sell some of these rights ... through a limited partnership Caja Madrid! at exorbitant prices. Seems like it gets to produce the usual miracle of the loaves and fishes ...
The evolution of white balance
merengue The balance for 1999 shows a certain weight of fixed assets, small reinforced by some fixed funds and deferred revenue, the liabilities side, a large amount of long-term liabilities and a negative working capital suggests that some strains of liquidity. The developments during the next year reinforces this tendency for the permanent resources of the white club do not give to fund all of its fixed assets but operations have been referred to favor a dramatic change: Having amortized completely immobilized sports equipment, fixed assets is deflated , while working capital becomes more important due to the sale of Sports City. Although equity still not desirable to make the grade book, the game has been produced with debt - to be concentrated in the heading of tax-deferred long-term - finally manages to turn the financial situation and encourage the emergence of a positive working capital.
quality passive
As we have seen, in the passive Real Madrid highlights its small capitalization. Possibly, this situation drag on earlier periods and respond to the need to take strong investment resorting to borrowing sports. Traditionally, income Deferred - a better game because they did not represent debt - have reinforced these scarce funds. It is undeniable that the management of this game for the Primera Liga club has managed to counter the force of the liability if required. Further, there was also change the quality of debt: is not the same duty a large sum of money to a bank, with financial costs that entails, which should the same or more to finance through the figure of deferred tax on profits, a 0% interest. However, the actions of the Finance Public also shed some dark clouds on the horizon because the club did not consider it appropriate to provide an allowance for the amount of inspection reports prepared by, signed under protest by the club and appealed for a whole about 48 million Euros .
subject to the audit file. Impact on the outcome
is concerned that under the first term accounts Florentino Perez has aroused suspicions of irregularities in the eyes of the ICAC, to the extent that he decided at the time to raise a record. Challenging an operation which in 2001 generated over 100 million euros profit and the possible conclusion that, in fact, it was a mere financial artifice, would lead to a reclassification of items that would make the accounting of the season pass, from 42.6 million euros benefit, possible loss of 73.6 million . A deficit of this magnitude would entail a much more pessimistic reading: equity of white club would be at that time below zero. However, Forbes repeatedly positioned Chamartin club in the top of its annual lists sports clubs, from the beginning of its publication in 2004. The EV / EBITDA result for Madrid is 0.03, far worse than the first in the list, Manchester United, who scored 0.07. Needless to say, if one were to reclassify the operations described above, this multiple would have negative value. Finally, interestingly, Forbes understands that if there is no debt merengue ... because it provides other than the bank!
No longer be trusted or Forbes ...
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